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Abstract. The noise in optical source needs to be characterized for the security of
continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). Two feasible schemes, based on
either active optical switch or passive beamsplitter are proposed to monitor the variance of
source noise, through which, Eve’s knowledge can be properly estimated. We derive the
security bounds for both schemes against collective attacks in the asymptotic case, and find
that the passive scheme performs better.
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1. Introduction
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) encodes information into the
quadratures of optical fields and extracts it with homodyne detection, which has higher
efficiency and repetition rate than that of the single photon detector [1]. CVQKD, especially
the GG02 protocol [2], is hopeful to realize high speed key generation between two parties,
Alice and Bob.
Besides experimental demonstrations [3, 4], the theoretical security of CVQKD has been
established against collective attacks [5, 6], which has been shown optimal in the asymptotical
limit [7]. The practical security of CVQKD has also been noticed in the recent years, and
it has been shown that the source noise in state preparation may be undermine the secure
key rate [8]. In GG02, the coherent states should be displaced in phase space following
Gaussian modulation with variance V . However, due to the imperfections in laser source and
modulators, the actual variance is changed to V +χs, where χs is the variance of source noise.
An method to describe the trusted source noise is the beamsplitter model [8, 9]. This
model has a good approximation for source noise, especially when the transmittance of
beamsplitter TA approaches 1, which means that the loss in signal mode is negligible.
However, this method has the difficulty of parameter estimation to the ancilla mode of the
beamsplitter, without the information of which, the covariance matrix of the system are
not able to determine. In this case, the optimality of Gaussian attack [10, 11] should be
reconsidered [12], and we have to assume that the channel is linear to calculate the secure
key rate. To solve this problem, we proposed an improved source noise model with general
unitary transformation [12]. Without extra assumption on quantum channel and ancilla state,
we are able to derive a tight security bound for reverse reconciliation, as long as the variance
of source noise χs can be properly estimated. The optimality of Gaussian attack is kept within
this model.
The remaining problem is to estimate the variance of source noise properly. Without such
a source monitor, Alice and Bob can not discriminate source noise from channel excess noise,
which is supposed to be controlled by the eavesdropper (Eve) [13]. In practice, source noise is
trusted and is not controlled by Eve. So, such untrusted source noise model just overestimates
Eve’power and leads to an untight security bound. A compromised method is to measure the
quadratures of Alice’s actual output states each time before starting experiment. However,
this work is time consuming, and in QKD running time, the variance of source noise may
fluctuate slowly and deviate from preliminary result. In this paper, we propose two real-time
schemes, that the active switch scheme and the passive beamsplitter scheme to monitor the
variance of source noise, with the help of which, we derive the security bounds asymptotically
for both of them against collective attacks, and discuss their potential applications when finite
size effect is taken into account.
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2. Source monitoring in CVQKD
In this section, we introduce two real-time schemes to monitor the variance of source noise
for the GG02 protocol, based on our general model. Both schemes are implemented in the so-
called prepare and measurement scheme (P&M scheme) [14], while for the ease of theoretical
research, here we analyze their security in the entanglement-based scheme (E-B scheme). The
covariance matrix, used to simplify the calculation, is defined by [14]
γi j = Tr[ρ{(rˆi − di), (rˆ j − d j)}], (1)
where operator rˆ2i−1 = xˆi, rˆ2i = pˆi, mean value di = 〈rˆi〉 = Tr[ρrˆi], ρ is the density matrix, and
{} denotes the anticommutator.
In E-B scheme, Alice prepares EPR pairs, measuring the quadratures of one mode with
two balanced homodyne detectors, and then send the other mode to Bob. It is easy to verify
that the covariance matrix of an EPR pair is
γAB0 =

VI
√
V2 − 1σz√
V2 − 1σz VI
 , (2)
where V = VA+1 is the variance of the EPR modes, and VA corresponds to Alice’s modulation
variance in the P&M scheme. However, due to the effect of source noise, the actual covariance
matrix is changed to
γAB0 =

VI
√
V2 − 1σz√
V2 − 1σz (V + χs)I
 , (3)
where χs is the variance of source noise. As mentioned in [12], we assume this noise is
introduced by a neutral party, Fred, who purifies ρAB and introduces the source noise with
arbitrary unitary transformation. In this section, we show how to monitor χs with our active
and passive schemes, and derive the security bounds in the infinite key limit.
2.1. Active switch scheme
A method of source monitoring is to use an active optical switch, controlled by a true random
number generator (TRNG), combined with a homodyne detection. The entanglement-based
version [15] of this scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1, where we randomly select parts of signal
pulses, measure their quadratures and estimate their variance. In the infinite key limit, the
pulses used for source monitor should have the same statistical identities with that sent to Bob.
Comparing the estimated value with the theoretical one, we are able to derive the variance of
source noise, and the security bound can be calculated by [12]
KOS = (1 − r) × [β × I(a : b) − S (E : b)], (4)
where r is the sampling ratio of source monitoring, I(a : b) is the classical mutual information
between Alice and Bob, S (E : b) is the quantum mutual information between Eve and Bob,
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Figure 1. (color online). Entanglement-based model for the optical switch scheme. Alice
measures one mode of EPR pairs and projects the other mode to coherent states, and then
sends it to Bob. F represents the neutral party, Fred, who introduces the source noise. Using
a high-speed optical switch driven by TRNG, we can measure part of the signal sent to B and
estimate the variance of source noise ∆V in the infinite key limit.
and β is the reconciliation efficiency. After channel transmission, the whole system can be
described by covariance matrix γFAB
γFAB =

F11 F12 F13 F′14
FT12 F22 F23 F
′
24
FT13 F
T
23 VI
√
η(V2 − 1)σz
(F′14)T (F′24)T
√
η(V2 − 1)σz η(V + χs + χ)I

, (5)
where χs is the variance of source noise, 2 × 2 matrix Fi j is related to Fred’s two-mode
state, η is the transmittance and χ = (1 − η)/η + ǫ is the channel noise and ǫ is the channel
excess noise. In practice, the covariance matrix can be estimated with experimental data with
source monitor and parameter estimation. Here, for the ease of calculation, we assume that
parameters η and ǫ have known values.
Given γFAB, the classical mutual information I(a : b) can be directly derived, while
S (E : b) can not, since the ancilla state F is unknown in our general model. Fortunately, we
can substitute γFAB with another state γ′FAB when calculating S (E : b) [12], where
γ′FAB =

I 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 (V + χs)I
√
η[(V + χs)2 − 1]σz
0 0
√
η[(V + χs)2 − 1]σz η(V + χs + χ)I

, (6)
and we have shown that such substitution provides a tight bound for reverse reconciliation.
Here, we have assumed that the pulses generated in Alice is i.i.d., and the true random
number plays an important role in this scheme, without which, the sampled pulses may have
different statistical characters from signal pulses sent to Bob. The asymptotic performance of
this scheme will be analyzed in sec. III.
2.2. Passive beam splitter scheme
Though the active switch scheme is intuitive in theoretical research, it is very not convenient
in the experimental realization, since the high speed optical switch and an extra TRNG are
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needed. Also, it lowers the secure key rate with (1 − r) due to the sampling ratio. Inspired
by [16], we propose a passive beam splitter scheme to simplify the implementation. As
illustrated in Fig. 2, a beamsplitter is used to separate mode B1 into two parts. One mode, M,
is monitored by Alice, and the other, B2, is sent to Bob.
The security bound of passive beam splitter scheme can be calculated in a similar way
that we substitute the whole state ρFAB1M0 with ρ′FAB1M0 . The covariance of its subsystem,
ρAB1M0 , can be written as
γ′AB1M0 =

(V + χs)I
√
(V + χs)2 − 1σz 0√
(V + χs)2 − 1σz (V + χs)I 0
0 0 I

, (7)
where mode M0 is initially in the vacuum state. The covariance matrix after beam splitter is
γ′AB2M = (IA ⊗ S BMBS )TγAB1M0(IA ⊗ S BMBS ), (8)
where
I
A ⊗ S BMBS =

I 0 0
0
√
T I
√
1 − T I
0 −
√
1 − T I
√
T I
 .
Then, mode B2 is sent to Bob through quantum channel, characterized by (η, χ). The
calculation of S (E : b) in this scheme is a little more complex, since an extra mode M is
introduced by the beamsplitter. We omit the detail of calculation here, which can be derived
from [14]. The performance of this scheme is discussed in the next section.
3. Simulation and Discussion
In this section, we analyze the performance of both schemes with numerical simulation. As
mentioned above, the simulation is restricted to the asymptotic limit. The case of finite size
will be discussed later. To show the performance of source monitor schemes, we illustrate the
secure key rate in Fig. 3, in which the untrusted noise scheme is included for comparison.
For the ease of discussion, the imperfections in practical detectors are not included in our
simulation, the effect of which have been studied previously [4].
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Figure 2. (color online). Entanglement-based model for the beamsplitter scheme. The optical
switch in Fig.1 is replaced by a beamsplitter. Alice and Bob are able to estimate the source
noise by measuring mode M with the homodyne detection.
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Figure 3. (color online). A comparison among the secure key rate of untrusted noise scheme,
optical switch scheme and beam splitter scheme for the GG02 protocol, which are in dash
line, dot-dash line and solid line, respectively. Typical values are used for each parameter.
The modulation variance is V = 40, the source noise is χs = 0.1, the channel excess noise is
ǫ = 0.1, and the reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.8. The sample ration in the optical switch
scheme is r = 0.5, and the transmittance in the beam splitter scheme is T = 0.5.
As shown in Fig. 3, secure key rate of each scheme is limited within 30km, where large
excess noise ǫ ∼ 0.1 is used. Under state-of-the-art technology, the excess noise can be
controlled less than a few percent of the shot noise. So, our simulation is just a conservative
estimation on the secure key rate. The untrusted source noise scheme has the shortest secure
distance, because it ascribes the source noise into channel noise, which is supposed to be
induced by the eavesdropper. In fact, source noise is neutral and can be controlled neither
by Alice and Bob, nor by Eve. So, this scheme just overestimates Eve’s power by supposing
she can acquire extra information from source noise, which lower the secure key rate of this
scheme.
Both the active and passive schemes have longer secure distance than the untrusted noise
scheme, since they are based on the general source noise model, which does not ascribe source
noise into Eve’s knowledge. The active switch scheme has lower secure key rate in the short
distance area. This is mainly because that the random sampling process intercepts parts of the
signal pulses to estimate the variance of source noise, which reduces the repetition rate with
ratio r. Nevertheless, it does not overestimate Eve’s power [12]. As a result, the secure key
distance is improved.
Both the secure key rate and secure distance of beam splitter scheme are superior than
that of other schemes, when the transmittance is set to be 0.5, equal to the sampling rate r
in optical switch scheme, where no extra vacuum noise is introduced. This phenomena is
quite similar to the ”noise beat noise” scheme [14], which improves the secure key rate by
introduce an extra noise into Bob’s side. Though such noise lowers the mutual information
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Figure 4. (color online). Secure key rate as a function of distance d and transmittance T , in
which T varies from 0.01 to 0.99. The colored parts illustrates the area with positive secure
key rate, the empty parts illustrates to insecure area, and the abscissa values of boundary points
corresponds to the secure distance.
between Alice and Bob, it also makes Eve more difficult to estimate Bob’s measurement result.
With the help of simulation, we find a similar phenomenon in the beam splitter scheme, the
vacuum noise reduces mutual information S (b : E) more rapidly than its effect on I(a : b).
A preliminary explanation is that the sampled pulse in optical switch scheme is just used
to estimate the noise variance, while in beam splitter model it increases Eve’s uncertainty
on Bob’s information. Combined with advantages in experimental realization, beam splitter
scheme should be a superior choice.
To optimize the performance of passive beam splitter scheme, we illustrate the secure
key rate in Fig. 4 for different beam splitter transmittance TA. The maximal secure distance
about 34km is achieved when T ∼ 0.1, about 10 km longer than that when T ∼ 0.5. Combined
with the discussion above, this result can be understood as a balance between the effects of
the noise on I(a : b) and S (b : E), induced by beamsplitter. When TA is too small, I(a : b)
also decreases rapidly, which limits the secure distance.
4. Finite size effect
The performance of source monitor schemes above is analyzed in asymptotical limit. In
practice, the real-time monitor will concern the finite-size effect, since the variance of source
noise may change slowly. A thorough research in finite size effect is beyond the scope of
this paper, because the security of CVQKD in finite size is still under development, that the
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optimality of Gaussian attack and collective attack has not been shown in the finite size case.
Nevertheless, we are able to give a rough estimation on the effect of block size, for a given
distance. Taking the active optical switch scheme for example, with a similar method in [17],
the maximum-likelihood estimator σˆs2 is given by
σˆs
2
=

1
m
m∑
i=1
y2i − V
 , (9)
where (mσˆs2/σ2s) ∼ χ2(m − 1), yi is the measurement result of source monitor, and σ2s = χs is
the expected value of the variance of source noise. For large m, the χ2 distribution converges
to a normal distribution. So, we have
σ2min ≈ σˆ2s − zǫSM
σˆ2s
√
2√
m
(10)
where zsm is such that 1−erf(zsm/
√
2) = ǫSM, and ǫS M is the failure probability. The reason why
we choose σˆmin is that given the values of η(V +χs+χ) and η, estimated by Bob, the minimum
of χs corresponds to the maximum of channel noise χ, which may be fully controlled by Eve.
The extra variance ∆mχs due to the finite size effect in source monitor is
∆mχs ≈
zSMσˆ
2
s
√
2√
m
. (11)
For ǫS M ∼ 10−10, we have zǫS M ≈ 6.5. As analyzed in [17], if the distance between Alice
and bob is 50 km (T ∼ 10−1), The block length should be at least 108, which corresponds to
∆mχs ∼ 10−6 induced by the finite size effect in source monitor. Compared with the channel
excess noise of 10−2, the effect of finite size in source monitor is very slight. Due to the high
repetition rate in CVQKD, Alice and Bob are able to accumulate such a block within several
minutes, during which the source noise may change slightly.
5. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, we propose two schemes, the active optical switch scheme and the passive
beamsplitter scheme, to monitor the variance of source noise χs. Combined with previous
general noise model, we derive tight security bounds for both schemes with reverse
reconciliation in the asymptotic limit. Both schemes can be implemented under current
technology, and the simulation result shows an better performance of our schemes, compared
with the untrusted source noise model. Further improvement in secure distance can be
achieved, when the transmittance TA is optimized.
In practise, the source noise varies slowly. To realize real-time monitoring, the finite size
effect should be taken into account, that the block size should not be so large, that the source
noise has changed significantly within this block, and the block size should not be too small,
that we can not estimate the source noise accurately. The security proof of CVQKD with finite
block size has not been established completely, since the optimality of collective attack and
Gaussian attack has not been shown in finite size. Nevertheless, we derive the effective source
noise induced by the finite block size, and find its effect is not significant in our scheme. So,
our schemes may be helpful to realize real-time source monitor in the future.
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